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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Gelean Mark appeals from his convictions in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of the Virgin Islands for engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.  We will affirm. 
I. 
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
On October 1, 2009, a grand jury handed down a superseding indictment against 
Gelean Mark and Jerome Blyden, charging them with participating in or operating a 
racketeering enterprise (“Mark/Blyden enterprise”) involving narcotics sales, illegal 
gambling, and violent acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (“RICO”) (Count One); 
attempted murder in aid of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (Count Two); 
assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering, also in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1959 (Count Three); and using a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (Count Five).
1
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 Counts Four, Six and Seven charged Blyden only with assault, money laundering 
and fraud offenses. 
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 The District Court granted Mark‟s first counsel several continuances of trial in 
recognition of the case‟s complexity and cumbersome discovery.  On February 5, 2010, 
Mark‟s first counsel was excused, and the court appointed new counsel to represent him.  
One week after being appointed, Mark‟s second counsel filed an emergency motion to 
continue, requesting at least a ninety-day extension of trial from the scheduled date of 
March 22, 2010.  The court granted a continuance for an additional forty-two days of 
preparation, but summarily denied the full ninety-day request. 
 Trial was held from May 3, 2010 to May 8, 2010.  The government presented 
taped phone conversations about drug trafficking and dogfighting between Mark and 
another member of the alleged narcotics trafficking conspiracy, Vernon Fagan, and 
conversations between other dealers discussing Mark‟s narcotics distribution network in 
the Virgin Islands.  Three government witnesses, Elton Turnbull, James Springette, and 
Glenson Isaac, testified that they were engaged in drug trafficking activity with Mark, 
and described an extensive drug trafficking network headed by Springette, with which 
Mark‟s drug trafficking enterprise was affiliated.  They also testified that Mark would 
secure drugs from the Springette organization at the airport in St. Thomas and facilitate 
their transport to the continental United States.  Turnbull further testified that Mark and 
Blyden had hosted dogfights in the Virgin Islands, and that he and Mark had pooled 
money to gamble on the fights on several occasions.  Isaac testified that he had attended a 
dogfight hosted by Mark in 2004, at which Mark won $80,000, and that drug proceeds 
were used “to bet that large quantity of money at dogfights.” 
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 On May 8, 2010, the jury returned a verdict of guilty against Mark on Counts One 
and Three (the RICO offenses), but acquitted him on Counts Two and Five.  Mark filed 
post-trial motions for judgment of acquittal and a new trial.  The District Court denied the 
motions, and sentenced Mark to 121 months‟ imprisonment.  Mark filed a timely appeal. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 48 U.S.C. 
§ 1612.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 48 U.S.C. § 1613. 
Mark presents four issues on appeal: the denial of his motion for a continuance; 
the use of the Virgin Islands dogfighting statute as a predicate RICO offense; the 
sufficiency of the evidence connecting his dogfighting and drug trafficking as a pattern of 
racketeering activity; and the admission of testimony on the Springette drug organization 
as irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. 
We address Mark‟s contentions in turn.  We review the denial of his motion for a 
continuance for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Rivera Constr. Co., 863 F.2d 293, 
295 n.3 (3d Cir. 2000).  Mark‟s challenge to the use of the Virgin Islands dogfighting 
statute as a predicate RICO offense presents a matter of statutory interpretation over 
which we exercise plenary review.  United States v. Parise, 159 F.3d 790, 794 (3d Cir. 
1998).  We exercise plenary review over the denial of a Rule 29 challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence, and view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005).  
 5 
We review a district court‟s admission of evidence for abuse of discretion, but exercise 
plenary review over its interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  United States v. 
Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 768 n.14 (3d Cir. 2000). 
III. 
Mark first asks for a new trial on the grounds that the District Court abused its 
discretion in denying his motion for a ninety-day continuance, and granting him forty-
two days instead.  The District Court‟s summary denial of the full request, after 
unreservedly granting prior extensions, leads us to surmise that nothing but the calendar 
of the court constrained its decision.  Although we give a judge “wide latitude” in 
exercising discretion over the grant of a continuance, judges “must balance the 
conflicting demands of court administration with the rights of the accused and [third 
parties] who would be affected by the consequences of a delay.”  Gov’t of Virgin Islands 
v. Charleswell, 115 F.3d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1997); see United States v. Kikumura, 947 
F.2d 72, 78 (3d Cir. 1991).  We do not tolerate a “rigid insistence on expedition” that, by 
constraining counsel‟s ability to prepare, may deprive a defendant of due process.  
Charleswell, 115 F.3d at 174 (quoting United States v. Rankin, 779 F.2d 956, 960 (3d 
Cir. 1986)).
2
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 This is a point which we emphasize:  the calendar of the court, when not dealing 
with a speedy trial question, should not trump a defendant‟s Sixth Amendment rights; in 
weighing a request for a continuance, the court‟s calendar should only play a minor role. 
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We fully acknowledge that trial preparation in this case was complicated.  Counsel 
was saddled with thousands of pages of discovery and prior trial transcripts, as well as 
numerous recordings; indeed, we have no quarrel with counsel‟s proffered justifications 
for seeking a continuance.  Nevertheless, we conclude that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion by granting a partial continuance.  In total, counsel had eighty-seven 
days to prepare a defense; RICO cases can be complex, but this was, objectively, ample 
time to obtain records, meet with the defendant, and subpoena witnesses, see United 
States v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 750 F.2d 1183, 1195 (3d Cir. 1984), and there were 
no sudden emergencies frustrating counsel‟s preparation on the eve of trial.  See 
Charleswell, 115 F.3d at 174.  The time allotted for trial preparation is often less than 
counsel may desire, and although Mark contends that the need for a continuance is 
substantiated by his counsel‟s ineffectiveness at trial, the proper method of addressing 
ineffective assistance of counsel is a claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984).  Consequently, we do not find that the District Court abused its discretion in 
granting a continuance of forty-two days instead of ninety. 
Mark next contends that the Virgin Islands dogfighting statute cannot be used as a 
predicate RICO offense because it is not an act involving gambling.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1961(1)(A).  We have consistently interpreted RICO to allow predicate acts similar to 
the dogfighting offense charged in this case, because “State offenses [listed in 
§ 1961(1)(A)] are included by generic designation.”  United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 
1127, 1137 (3d Cir. 1977) (citation omitted).  “The test for determining whether the 
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charged acts fit into the generic category of the predicate offense is whether the 
indictment charges a type of activity generally known or characterized in the proscribed 
category . . . .”  Id. (emphasis added).  Gambling is defined as “the act or practice of 
betting,” or “the act of risking something on an uncertain event.”  Webster’s Third New 
Int’l Dictionary (1981).  The Virgin Islands dogfighting statute, under which a defendant 
is punishable for acting “for any bet, stake, or reward,” 19 V.I.C. § 2613a(a), clearly falls 
within the category of gambling offenses.  Mark‟s argument that dogfighting cannot be a 
predicate offense because it is part of a health code segment of the Virgin Islands Code is 
likewise meritless.  RICO requires only that the offense be chargeable under state law 
and punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.  18 U.S.C. § 1961(A)(1).  The 
dogfighting statute qualifies because it is a chargeable offense punishable by up to two 
years of imprisonment.  See 19 V.I.C. § 2613a(a)(4).  Accordingly, the government did 
not need to charge a predicate act under the Virgin Islands‟ gambling statute. 
Mark is also incorrect that RICO requires that gambling be a necessary element of 
the predicate offense.  In Forsythe, we approved the use of a predicate offense which 
involved bribery only in the disjunctive, rather than as a required element, because the 
defendant was charged under the bribery prong.  560 F.2d at 1137-38.  Likewise, Mark 
was charged in the indictment based on his dogfighting wagers, and the jury was 
instructed solely on the gambling prong of the offense, thereby requiring the jury to find 
that his conduct in fact “involved” gambling.  Thus, Mark‟s conduct falls squarely within 
the RICO statute. 
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Mark‟s third argument is that there was insufficient evidence to tie together the 
dogfighting and drug trafficking as a pattern of racketeering activity.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1961(5), 1962(c).  A pattern of racketeering activity under RICO is established by 
showing “continuity plus relationship” among predicate acts.  Sedima S.P.R.I. v. Imrex 
Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985) (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-617, at 158 (1969)).  
Although sporadic and separate criminal activities cannot alone give rise to a pattern for 
RICO purposes, United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 565 (3d Cir. 1991), in organized 
crime cases, relatedness and continuity may be established “by connecting diverse 
predicate acts to an enterprise „whose business is racketeering activity.‟”  United States v. 
Basciano, 599 F.3d 184, 202 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Indelicato, 865 
F.2d 1370, 1383 (3d Cir. 1989)).  Because “a criminal enterprise is more, not less, 
dangerous if it is versatile,” Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 566 (citation omitted), RICO tolerates 
the possibility that the predicate acts themselves may be diverse.  United States v. 
Bergrin, 650 F.3d 257, 270-71 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Under our longstanding interpretation of RICO, the evidence was sufficient in this 
case to establish the requisite relationship between the dogfighting and the drug 
trafficking conspiracies.  Both operations furthered the Mark/Blyden enterprise‟s 
purposes, broadly defined in the Superseding Indictment to include “[e]nriching the 
members and associates” and “[p]romoting and enhancing the enterprise.”  The same 
individuals involved in the drug trafficking conspiracies – Mark and Blyden – also hosted 
the dogfights, wagering and winning exceedingly large amounts of money, at times up to 
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$50,000, and, as with the drug trafficking, Mark was the central player in organizing the 
dogfights.  Further, based on Isaac‟s testimony that drug proceeds were used to “bet that 
large quantity of money” on dogfights, a reasonable jury could conclude that money was 
funneled between the two endeavors.  This evidence was more than sufficient to prove 
the requisite relationship between the dogfighting and drug trafficking. 
 In a final foray, Mark offers two arguments that the District Court abused its 
discretion in admitting evidence of the Springette drug organization: first, that it was not 
admissible for any relevant purpose; second, that even if it was relevant, it was unfairly 
prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.  Neither argument prevails. 
 First, evidence of the Springette organization was relevant to Mark‟s drug 
trafficking and RICO charges as information establishing the organized existence and 
purposes of the Mark/Blyden enterprise and the predicate acts.  Evidence is considered 
relevant in a RICO case if it tends to show the “existence and nature” of a criminal 
organization or enterprise, as well as its “history, structure and internal discipline . . . , 
and the regular means by which it conducted unlawful business.”  Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 
573.  In this case, testimony about the Springette organization, including the drug 
production, transportation, and distribution system, was relevant to show the “existence 
and nature” of the Mark/Blyden enterprise, see id., and specifically, to show that the drug 
offenses were systematic and related, thereby forming a “pattern” for RICO purposes.  
This evidence was also probative of the defendants‟ roles and responsibilities within a 
larger drug trafficking network, see id., an integral part of the prosecution‟s effort to 
 10 
demonstrate Mark‟s “knowing participation in and association with the RICO enterprise.”  
United States v. DiSalvo, 34 F.3d 1204, 1221 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 Second, the Springette evidence was not unfairly prejudicial under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403.
3
  Not every hint of prejudice requires exclusion, see United States v. 
Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 644 (3d Cir. 1988), particularly in a RICO case such as this, 
where the criminal acts of one defendant are related to the criminal acts of others.  See, 
e.g., DiSalvo, 34 F.3d at 1220-21.  If the evidence proves “essential elements of the 
RICO charges,” Rule 403 does not require exclusion so long as the evidence could not 
have been offered in any less prejudicial way and the jury has received appropriate 
instructions.  Id.  In this case, evidence of the Springette organization was highly 
probative of the existence and nature of the RICO enterprise.  The judge instructed the 
jury to ignore Springette‟s drug organization as substantive evidence of the Mark/Blyden 
enterprise, reminding the jury that “the defendants [were] not on trial for any act or any 
conduct not specifically charged in the indictment,” and to “consider only the offenses 
charged against the defendants in the indictment.”  And because Springette 
predominantly described the roles of coconspirators other than Mark, the jury was not 
likely to confuse these other crimes with the charged conduct.  In sum, the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the Springette organization. 
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 For the same reason, Mark‟s reference to Rule 404(b) as a basis for exclusion is 
misplaced. 
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IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
